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Abstract 
 
This paper claims that established accounts of international political 
theory overlook the neo-roman strand of republican political theory. It 
seeks to address this case of neglect and extend republican observations 
into international political theory in three steps. The first step examines 
the nature of international political theory. The second step examines the 
neo-roman strand of republicanism’s conception of liberty and the 
institutions whereby this type of liberty is secured. Lastly, the main 
elements of a republican approach to international political theory are 
developed in a way that highlights republicanism’s institutional approach 
to world politics and its commitment to the state. 
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The neo-roman republican legacy and 
international political theory 
STEVEN SLAUGHTER1
The purpose of this paper is to claim that the cosmopolitan–
communitarian divide within international political theory (IPT) misses an 
important and long forgotten strand of political thinking—that of the neo-
roman strand of republican political theory. While various strands of 
communitarian thought are well represented in IPT,2 the neo-roman 
republican idea that political institutions ought to contest power and 
secure individual liberty is missing within IPT literature. The revival of 
neo-roman republicanism within political theory is attributable to writers 
such as Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit.3 These writers have emphasised 
that reflections upon the historical and ideational ascendance of liberalism 
misses a distinct phase of Western history where a republican-inspired 
conception of liberty and good government reigned that was distinct from 
liberalism. While this revival has been important within political theory 
and the history of ideas, it has not systematically engaged with the 
international implications of this theory. In this sense the revival of 
republican thought is significantly incomplete.  
This article seeks to address this case of mutual neglect and extend these 
republican observations into the international sphere by suggesting that neo-
roman republicanism offers a distinct and compelling perspective on how 
global politics ought to be organised. This argument has three steps. The 
first step seeks to examine the positions within IPT by exploring the 
positions of realism and idealism as well as cosmopolitanism and 
1  Lecturer in International Relations, Deakin University. I would like to thank Yvette Slaughter, Philip 
Pettit and Lorraine Elliot for their constructive advice, although the usual disclaimers apply. I also 
thank the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University for the 
hospitality provided while this paper was written. 
2  See Chris Brown, ‘Review article: Theories of international justice’, British Journal of Political 
Science 27(2) 1997, pp. 273–97, and Nicholas Rengger, ‘Political theory and international relations: 
Promised land or exit from Eden?’, International Affairs 76(4) 2000, pp. 755–70. 
3  In this paper republicanism refers to the neo-roman account of republicanism. 
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communitarianism.4 The second step turns to an explanation of the neo-
roman strand of republicanism that includes both its conception of liberty 
and the institutions whereby this type of liberty is secured. Lastly, the main 
elements and claims of republicanism as an approach to IPT are explored. 
The primary objective of this paper is to provide a reasonably modest 
standard of proof for republicanism: that it is a viable and valuable 
alternative to prevailing approaches to IPT. 
Before proceeding further it is important to note that I am aware that in 
examining what constitutes a republican approach to global politics, I am 
sidestepping important questions such as why republicanism has not 
generally been systematically involved within IPT or international relations 
(IR) and could be seen to be lifting republican notions out of an early 
modern context to a late modern context where they are ill suited and 
inconsonant. While the applicability of republican ideas within a globalising 
context clearly requires further study, the argument here rests primarily 
upon the recent scholarship of those reviving republican ideas and does not 
intend to resurrect the spirit of Machiavelli or Rousseau holus-bolus. 
Indeed, the intent here is to contrast a republican conception of politics to 
the more established approaches within IPT.  
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY 
Before the normative aspects of a republican perspective can be unfurled 
it is necessary to outline the manner in which investigations into the ethics 
of international politics are conducted. The examination of international or 
global ethics can be found in a number of political and philosophical 
disciplines including political theory and IR. Normative theory in regards 
to world politics is referred to as ‘international political theory’5 or 
‘normative international relations theory’.6 Chris Brown defines this 
theory 
4  Kimberly Hutchings, International political theory: Rethinking ethics in a global era (London: Sage, 
1999), chapters 1 and 2. 
5  Ibid., p. xi.  
6  Chris Brown, International relations theory: New normative approaches (New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
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as a body of work which addresses the moral dimension of international 
relations and the wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by 
the discipline. At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the relations 
between communities/states, whether in the context of the old agenda, which 
focused on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda, which mixes these 
traditional concerns with the modern demand for international distributive 
justice.7
This observation illustrates the long-standing but shifting way in which 
scholars of international relations and political theory have reflected on 
ethical concerns in world politics. IPT is the scholarly reflection on the 
nature, existence and problems of global ethics, which in the contem-
porary period have expanded beyond questions of war and distributive 
justice to issues of just governance and economic organisation as well as 
new issues of justice.8
According to Kimberly Hutchings, IPT can be seen to reflect on political 
life in at least two senses.9 The first is the idealist–realist axis, a contrast that 
since the seventeenth century has rested on a ‘double distinction: the 
distinction between morality and politics on one hand and the distinction 
between state and international politics on the other’.10 In IR theory this 
contrast has of course been drawn between the realist emphasis on state 
survival with the claim that states ought to operate according to an estab-
lished morality or indeed promote individual justice at a global level.11 
Realism makes the claim of ‘moral scepticism’ in world politics.12 This 
claim is that moral claims are not possible in the international realm because 
political action in an anarchical world is limited to survival which means 
that justice and even interstate cooperation come well after principles of 
  7  Ibid., p. 3. 
  8  Andrew Linklater, ‘The evolving spheres of international justice’, International Affairs 75(3) 1999, 
pp. 473–82. 
  9  Hutchings, International political theory, chapters 1 and 2. 
10  Ibid., p. 23. 
11  Charles R. Beitz, Political theory and international relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979). 
12  Ibid., p. 13. 
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‘prudence’ and of power.13 At the other end of this axis rests the idealist 
position which forwards a belief that international politics is in fact a moral 
realm where justice and law can be developed. This position rails against 
the notion that international politics is a realm of reoccurrence and repetition 
by arguing in support of the notion that individuals and states can learn to 
avoid interstate violence and selfishness—through the development of 
cooperation and institutions. According to the idealist position, a state’s 
interests ought to include concern for justice and the rule of law in world 
politics. Thus this divide is focused upon the question of whether the 
international realm is hospitable to moral principles and rules. 
The second sense in which IPT can be understood is the communitarian–
cosmopolitan axis or ‘divide’.14 According to this axis the issue is whether 
the human species or the nation-state is the limit of moral community. 
However, Richard Shapcott notes that 
much of the literature in political theory on which the International Relations 
literature draws is not concerned with boundaries as such but with disputes 
over the nature, source or grounding of morality. Characterized as a debate 
between liberals and communitarians, the central question is about how we 
acquire knowledge of the good, and the relationship between the right and the 
good, rather than over the boundaries of the moral community.15
Of course this divide is a ‘very crude aid’ because many scholars navigate 
intricate paths through these poles.16 Moreover, the liberal–communitarian 
debate itself can be criticised on many grounds, including on the grounds that 
the debate overstates the distinction between the two positions. This is 
especially true if we consider that liberalism has historically depended on 
communitarian affiliations in order to operate as a moral/political theory as 
13  Hans Morgenthau, Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace, brief edition (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 12. 
14  Richard Shapcott, ‘Beyond the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide: Justice, difference and 
community in international relations’, in Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz, eds, Value pluralism, 
normative theory and international relations (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 2000). 
15  Shapcott, ‘Beyond the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide’, p. 101. 
16  Chris Brown, Sovereignty, rights, and justice: International political theory today (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2002), p. vii. 
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well as a way of life.17 Nevertheless the communitarian–cosmopolitan divide 
asks important questions: where and how is morality constituted and where 
should moral accountability ultimately lie? While the idealist–realist axis asks 
what motivation dominates world politics—self-interest or an interest in 
justice—the communitarian–cosmopolitan axis examines whether particular 
or universal moral principles should be the gauge of ethics. Different authors 
can be marked out as positions within the communitarian–cosmopolitan 
divide.18 Positions within a broadly communitarian framework that promote 
and defend particularism include Michael Walzer, Mervyn Frost and David 
Miller, while various cosmopolitan accounts can be found in the works of 
David Held, Mary Kaldor, Richard Falk, Martha Nussbaum and Andrew 
Linklater. 
The diversity of these writers clearly demonstrates that cosmopolitanism 
is ‘not monolithic’.19 Some cosmopolitan positions emphasise the pre-
existing nature of human community,20 while others emphasise the develop-
ment of global moral responsibility as actual practical interdependence 
expands globally.21 Another distinction is made between ‘political’ cosmo-
politanism which forwards the creation of universal political institutions at a 
global level, on one hand and ‘moral’ cosmopolitanism on the other, which 
advances universal principles that do not automatically require global 
institutions but affirms ‘the basis on which institutions should be justified or 
criticised’.22  
In between these axes, some scholars have made the claim that while 
world politics has a moral nature it is only states that have ‘moral 
17  Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and modern society: A historical argument (University Park, Pa.: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
18  See Brown, ‘Review article’, and Rengger, ‘Political theory and international relations’. 
19  Rengger, ‘Political theory and international relations’, p. 763. 
20  See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, in Joshua Cohen, ed., For love of country 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1996). 
21  See Beitz, Political theory and international relations. 
22  Charles Beitz, ‘International liberalism and distributive justice: A survey of recent thought’, World 
Politics 51(2) 1999, pp. 269–96, at p. 287. See also Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, 
pp. 7–8. 
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character’.23 There is also the observation that there are some strands of 
liberalism, in particular those that Charles Beitz refers to as ‘social 
liberalism’, which claim that the domestic character of justice claims differ 
from international claims.24 Beitz suggests that ‘social liberalism holds that 
the problem of international justice is fundamentally one of fairness to 
societies (or peoples), whereas cosmopolitan liberalism holds that it is 
fairness to persons’.25 Thus there is the internationalist claim that states (or 
societies/peoples) are morally relevant and sovereignty protects them from 
some (but not all) claims of international justice as morality in the 
international realm is a ‘thin’ account that falls short of the ‘thick’ morality 
of actual communities.26 As such internationalists advance the claim that 
only states have rights and obligations within international society. This 
means that moral claims are possible in world politics but only those that 
affect justice between states can be justifiable—not justice between 
individuals in different states.27 Thus justice is recognised as a delimited 
practice but ought not come at the expense of order or the ability of states to 
coexist and cooperate within this ‘society of states’.28 Nevertheless, it must 
be noted that in recent times in political practice, this ‘thin’ account of 
morality has been ‘thickening’ in some respects as human rights and other 
issues are having an increased influence on the nature of world politics. 
Thus, in contrast to realist and internationalist perspectives on morality 
and governance, the cosmopolitan arguments of the last two decades have 
pushed the powerful idea that states are not a viable location for a just future 
and that the states system is modifiable towards a more inclusive and just 
global order. Most telling have been cosmopolitan arguments forwarding 
the idea of distributive justice between rich and poor individuals (not just 
23  Beitz, Political theory and international relations, p. 76. 
24  Charles Beitz, ‘Social and cosmopolitan liberalism’, International Affairs 75(3) 1999, pp. 515–29. 
25  Ibid., p. 515. 
26  Michael Walzer, Thick and thin: Moral argument at home and abroad (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994). 
27  See Hedley Bull, The anarchical society, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan Press, 1995 [1977]).  
28  Ibid., and Hedley Bull, Justice in international relations (Waterloo, Ont.: University of Waterloo, 
1984). 
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between rich and poor states) in a world of truly graphic inequality.29 In 
addition, the intensification of globalising trends, including the positive 
indications of a transnational civil society and global consciousness, have 
been central to the cosmopolitan critique of the states system. Falk, for 
example, has mounted a wide-ranging cosmopolitan critique on the 
‘inhumane governance’ perpetuated by the state-system within the context 
of globalisation,30 while Held has claimed that state bound democracy is 
problematised by globalisation to such a degree that global cosmopolitan 
democracy is required for democracy to be fulfilled.31 Indeed it must be 
noted that cosmopolitan argumentation of both moral and political 
derivations is decisively shaping the field of IPT even if global political life 
is still largely dominated by communitarian—as well as realist and 
internationalist—inclinations. Nicholas Rengger notes that ‘cosmopolitan 
theory, for all that it is greatly criticized, is very much setting the agenda for 
international political theory at present’.32  
The question that this paper seeks to address is how republicanism could 
fit into the field of IPT. It is also important to assess how compatible 
republicanism is with cosmopolitanism given the way in which the 
universalism of cosmopolitanism is shaping IPT. In order to assess how 
republicanism fits into IPT we must outline the philosophical and political 
legacy of neo-roman republicanism.  
NEO-ROMAN REPUBLICANISM 
In recent years there has been a revival of republicanism, a way of 
thinking about liberty and good government. Republicanism draws 
inspiration from the Roman period but only gained coherence in the 
Italian Renaissance and later in the revolutions in England, France and 
America. The central contemporary articulators of the neo-roman repub-
lican tradition, for the purposes of this article, are Skinner, Pettit, Maurizio 
29  Beitz, ‘Social and cosmopolitan liberalism’. 
30  Richard Falk, On humane governance: Toward a new global politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995). 
31  David Held, Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan governance 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 1–2. 
32  Rengger, ‘Political theory and international relations’, p. 763. 
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Viroli and Richard Bellamy. The central claim of these writers is that 
before the ascendancy of liberalism, the republican view of liberty was a 
prominent political conception that ‘slipped from sight’ during the 
nineteenth century.33 This disappearance also occurred in thinking about 
politics in an international sense.34 Central to the historical legacy of 
republicanism are the figures of Charles De Secondat Montesquieu, 
Niccoló Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Harrington. The 
contemporary revival of neo-roman republicanism has centred on this 
strand of thought being distinct from both liberalism and communi-
tarianism.35 As a political theory, republicanism has broadly criticised 
both liberalism, for its asocial view of freedom, and communitarianism, 
for the idea that involvement in a pre-political community can define 
freedom.36 The guiding ideal of republicanism is that people must avoid 
domination by controlling public power. The ideal of non-domination has 
historically been conducted within a republican state shaped and con-
trolled by a politically aware society who feel responsible for the state. 
This understanding of republicanism aims for an individual liberty that is 
only possible if it is constituted and institutionalised collectively.37
The neo-roman conception of republicanism differs considerably from 
liberalism’s concern for negative liberty, or the non-interference of the state 
in individuals’ affairs, by claiming that non-arbitrary state intervention can 
actually assist in the constitution of liberty, rather than being a necessary 
evil in need of restraint.38 The interpretation of the republican tradition 
drawn from the roman account differs markedly from the contemporary 
communitarian position heralded by Hannah Arendt and authors such as 
33  Quentin Skinner, Liberty before liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. ix. 
34  Nicholas Onuf, The republican legacy in international thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), pp. 2–3. 
35  Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 7–8; Quentin Skinner, ‘On justice, the common good and the priority of liberty’, in 
Chantal Mouffe, ed., Dimensions of radical democracy: Pluralism, citizenship, community (London: 
Verso, 1992), pp. 222–3. 
36  Bill Brugger, Republican theory in political thought: Virtuous or virtual? (London: Macmillan Press, 
1999), pp. 12–14. 
37  Ibid., p. 2. 
38  Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 22–3. 
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Michael Sandel and David Miller.39 A clear distinction is drawn between 
communitarianism evident within the tradition of Aristotle and the neo-
roman view of republicanism that stems from Machiavelli.40 Pettit, Skinner 
and Bellamy hold that there is a distinction between the belief that par-
ticipation in a political community is the constitution of liberty in the sense 
of positive liberty, and the neo-roman republican conception that political 
participation is the only means to establish a condition where society is free 
from domination. That is ‘rather than trading on a moralistic conception of 
positive liberty, therefore, Machiavelli urged civic involvement to avoid the 
domination of tyrants or elites’.41 Political activity on the part of citizens in 
this sense is the crucial step in the construction of liberty or ‘non-
domination’ as Pettit refers to it.42
The neo-roman strand of republicanism emphasises three key themes. 
The first is the constitutive relationship between liberty and the state. 
According to republican thought the pursuit of liberty is not a natural 
attribute but rather a civic achievement that requires a context where 
citizens are free from tyranny or domination.43 The republican conception 
of ‘freedom consists not in the presence of self-mastery, and not in the 
absence in interference by others, but in the absence of mastery by others: in 
absence … of domination’.44 Pettit claims domination is defined by a 
relationship where 
one person is dominated by another, so I shall assume, to the extent that the 
other person has the capacity to interfere in their affairs, in particular the 
capacity to interfere in their affairs on an arbitrary basis … In the most salient 
case it is the capacity to interfere as the interferer’s wish or judgement—their 
arbitrium—inclines them … If freedom means non-domination, then such 
39  Richard Bellamy, Rethinking liberalism (London: Pinter, 2000), p. xii. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 4. 
43  Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and pluralism: Towards a politics of compromise (London: Routledge, 
1999), p. 120. 
44  Philip Pettit, ‘Republican freedom and contestatory democratisation’, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano 
Hacker-Cordón, eds, Democracy’s values (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 165. 
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freedom is compromised whenever a person is exposed to the arbitrary power 
of another, even if that power is not used against them.45
Therefore, republican non-domination is a condition that is defined by 
the diminution or elimination of the act of arbitrary intervention and the 
capacity to arbitrarily interfere in a person’s life.46 Non-domination can thus 
be understood as liberty that includes a sense of security from various forms 
of power that could beset an individual and reduce their capacity to control 
their life.47
Consequently, non-domination reflects a concern with the way that 
people can become dependent upon others. Hence the ways special interests 
and ambition/self-interest can corrupt the body politic and usher in 
dependency on the goodwill of these special interests, as well as more 
personal forms of domination in the home or workplace for instance, are of 
equal concern to the republican.48 Non-domination is understood as the 
avoidance of subordination and vulnerability (rather than the liberal fear of 
restraint) and is dependent not upon the level of non-interference but the 
‘extent that there exist institutional protections against interference’ of an 
arbitrary kind.49 Thus republicans contend that publicly governed non-
arbitrary law enables liberty in contrast to the liberal view that law restricts 
liberty and is only justifiable by lesser overall restrictions in the presence of 
law.50 Republicanism is a constitutional perspective on ethics and politics 
which stresses that liberty understood as non-domination ‘comes about only 
by design’; it is the ‘freedom of the city, not the freedom of the heath’.51
Enacting non-domination in practice requires a republic. A republic (also 
known as a commonwealth or a res publica) is a type of state that is defined 
by the principle of sovereign self-government and is publicly controlled and 
45  Ibid. 
46  Pettit, Republicanism, chapter 2.  
47  Philip Pettit, ‘Freedom as antipower’, Ethics 106(3) 1996, pp. 576–604, at p. 589. 
48  Ibid., pp. 589–91. 
49  Brugger, Republican theory in political thought, pp. 6–7. 
50  Ibid., p. 6. 
51  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 122. 
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focused on a common or public good.52 The point of this form of polity is to 
be free from both ‘imperium’, that is domination by the state, and from 
‘dominium’, meaning domination by private interests within society.53 Thus 
the republic and the publicly controlled and thus non-arbitrary interference 
it imparts does not cause liberty but it ‘constitutes’ it54—thereby acting as a 
form of ‘antipower’ aimed at curtailing domination.55 Pettit agues that the 
republican position is ‘that a state would not itself dominate its citizens—
and could provide a unique protection against domination based on the 
private power or internal or external enemies—provided that it was able to 
seek only ends, and employ only means, that derived from the public good, 
the common weal, the res publica’.56 This protection is established by a 
range of public institutions that compensate for various forms of subjection 
and vulnerability.57 Thus central to the republican tradition is the existence 
of a state shaped by the idea of ‘public power’—that is power that is 
publicly controlled and limited in the aims it is able to pursue but focused 
on the public aims it must fulfill in order to constitute liberty.58
The second republican theme is the public good, understood not as a 
communally developed and pre-political conception of the good life, nor an 
aggregation of individual interests, but rather as a constructed common 
interest in goods that are not able to be obtained individually—particularly a 
shared liberty.59 Non-domination is a shared and constitutive condition that 
is typified by the security of individuals understood as a public good. This 
52  Skinner, ‘On justice, the common good and the priority of liberty’, p. 217. 
53  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 13. 
54  Ibid., p. 108. 
55  Pettit, ‘Freedom as antipower’, pp. 588–9. 
56  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 287. 
57  Pettit, ‘Freedom as antipower’, p. 590. 
58  A republican purpose for the state is noted in Denis Diderot, L’Encyclopedie: ‘The aim of all 
government is the wellbeing of the society governed. In order to avoid anarchy, to enforce the laws, 
to protect the citizens, to support the weak against the ambitions of the strong, it was necessary that 
each society establish authorities with sufficient power to fulfill these aims’. Translated in John 
Ralston Saul, The doubter’s companion: A dictionary of aggressive common sense (New York: The 
Free Press, 1994), pp. 237–8. 
59  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 284. 
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observation is underlined by Pettit’s claim that non-domination is an 
‘egalitarian good’ and a ‘communitarian good’ in that it is only realisable if 
the non-domination is enjoyed more or less equally and has ‘common and 
social’ character—‘it is not the atomistic good associated with non-
interference’.60 Indeed the republican conception of the common or public 
good is where 
one cannot create such an environment except through active collaboration 
with others, nor control the beneficial externalities it generates so as to 
channel them only to certain others, though one could cut oneself off from 
them through one’s own anti-social and intolerant actions. Put another way, 
the condition of living as equals has to be desired in and for itself—as an 
intrinsic aspect of a certain kind of society—rather than instrumentally, since 
it would allow selective domination to acquire personal advantage.61  
Thus the public nature of the republican conception of liberty is only 
possible if it is constituted collectively and institutionalised by a state that 
is principally designed to ‘track’ all the common interests held by the 
citizenry.62  
The third theme central to republicanism is that of citizenship and 
political participation. Again rather than being an end to political life, 
republicanism understands political participation as a crucial part in the 
promotion of the public good and the avoidance of domination. Rather than 
direct participation in the operation of all government decisions, republican 
thought has emphasised the importance of various avenues of contestation 
for decisions that are made by public representatives to ensure that public 
decisions reflect the public good and do not promote particular interests.63 
Thus citizenship is a virtuous concern in the public good evident by an 
active interest in public affairs that sees ‘the people as trustor both 
individually and collectively and sees the state as trustee: in particular it sees 
the people as trusting the state to ensure a dispensation of non-arbitrary 
60  Ibid., p. 125. 
61  Bellamy, Liberalism and pluralism, p. 139. 
62  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 290. 
63  Pettit forwards the idea of ‘contestatory democracy’ where people have both ‘authorial’ and 
‘editorial’ powers and avenues in relation to government decisions. Pettit, Republicanism, p. 296. 
See also Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 65–7. 
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rule’.64 This trust is backed up by a structure of the state that ensures the 
dispersal of power over a range of institutional bodies and a virtuous 
practice of citizenship that involves vigilance and a concern over the public 
good that transcends individuals own pecuniary or particular interests.65 
Thus rather than a necessary evil, the state is a crucial artifice of and for the 
people whom are its citizens. 
Now, it is clear from the last two points that republicanism accepts the 
state as the locus for republican practice and promotes practices of virtue 
and patriotism. While critical theorists would be quick to note the inclusion 
and exclusion embedded in this account,66 it is important to note two points 
that significantly moderate any idea of chauvinism in republican thought. 
First, republicanism must be differentiated from communitarian claims that 
deify particularist principles or nationalism. Republicanism is not a 
nationalistic theory in that it invokes a ‘love of the political institutions and 
the way of life that sustain the common liberty of a people’ rather than a 
love of a nation’s ‘cultural, linguistic and ethnic oneness’.67 Republicanism 
also emphasises difference and promotes institutional avenues to support 
pluralism.68 Second, while nationality could be a ‘partial replacement’ for 
patriotism in the modern world,69 it is not sufficient for the active political 
motivation and participation embedded in the practice of patriotism.70 
Patriotism and citizenship are ‘sustained by shared memories of [a] com-
mitment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance against oppression and 
corruption’.71 Ultimately, republicanism does not embed any nationalistic 
norms or conception of the good life other than norms that entail public 
64  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 8. 
65  Skinner, ‘On justice, the common good and the priority of liberty’, p. 217. 
66  See Andrew Linklater, ‘The question of the next stage in international relations theory: A critical-
theoretical point of view’, Millennium 21(1) 1992, pp. 77–98. 
67  Maurizio Viroli, For love of country: An essay on patriotism and nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), p. 1.  
68  Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 40–1. See also Bellamy, 
Liberalism and pluralism.  
69  Miller, ‘Bounded citizenship’, p. 67.  
70  Viroli, For love of country, pp. 11–13. 
71  Ibid., p. 13.  
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responsibility and oversight—norms that reflect the social nature of the 
morality that constitutes non-domination.72
Republicanism provides a powerful statement of the potential of an 
appropriately designed state to achieve a robust account of liberty. Both 
liberalism and republicanism agree that the state should seek to uphold 
liberty but whereas liberalism claims this is possible by ensuring the non-
interference in the chosen decisions of people, republicanism 
maintains that this can never be sufficient, since it will always be necessary 
for the state to ensure at the same time that its citizens do not fall into a 
condition of avoidable dependence on the goodwill of others. The state has a 
duty not to merely liberate its citizens from such personal exploitation and 
dependence, but to prevent its own agents, dressed in a little brief authority, 
from behaving arbitrarily in the course of imposing the rules that govern our 
common life.73
The scope of republican concern extends, as Skinner explains, not just to 
wariness of the state but to private sources of domination as well. 
Consequently, non-domination is a more demanding standard of freedom 
than non-interference in terms of the resources and laws needed to obtain it. 
While the liberal account of non-interference allows well organised or 
wealthy groups in society to dominate the political process and permits 
forms of personal vulnerability to develop from inequality and the relative 
absence of state intervention, the bottom line for republicanism is that all 
forms of power—both public and private—must be contestable. The 
republican state’s law-making power is designed to remove ‘certain forms 
of domination without putting new forms of domination in their place’.74
Republicanism also distances itself from the direct democracy evident  
in some communitarian arguments to such an extent that Bill Brugger 
argues that Pettit’s interpretation of republicanism is best termed ‘weak 
republicanism’.75 Pettit himself regards his conception of republicanism as 
72  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 8. See also Viroli, For love of country. 
73  Skinner, Liberty before liberalism, p. 119. 
74  Pettit, ‘Freedom as antipower’, p. 588. 
75  Brugger, Republican theory in political thought, p. 13. It is also important to note that contemporary 
republicanism is part of the legacy of republicanism that is long and winding and notable for its 
discontinuity as much as its historical coherence. Brugger notes that the militarism of early modern 
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‘gas-and-water-works republicanism’ which departs from romantic accounts 
of republicanism or democracy where 
the goal is a dispensation under which the high ideal of freedom as non-
domination flourishes. And certainly that dispensation requires a regime under 
which constitutionalism and democracy rule. But constitutionalism and 
democracy come to be stabilized only via arrangements that are no more 
intellectually beguiling than the infrastructure of gas and water supply.76
This practical vision is what shapes the contemporary articulation of 
republicanism—it does not require a step back to the positive liberty or the 
‘liberty of the ancients’.77 The state is a crucial framework of public power 
and central to the republican legacy. The republican state is empowered to 
prevent certain people becoming dominated by others, it is designed not to 
be corrupted by sectional interests within society, and the state itself is 
legally and morally constrained from dominating people. However, repub-
licanism rules out political passivity and requires a public ethos that entails 
that citizens actively cherish the state institutions that act as a bulwark 
against arbitrary forms of power in addition to being wary and vigilant in 
respect to potential threats to the public good.78 Republicanism demands 
virtue and public concern on the part of citizens in order to contest power 
and construct institutions that secure the protection of citizens from 
domination. This requires citizens to be actively concerned about political 
affairs and existence of institutional mechanisms in which government 
action is transparent and open to public discipline 
This overview of republicanism demonstrates the ways in which neo-
roman republicanism intersects the liberal–communitarian debate. While 
republicanism is concerned with individual liberty it claims that such liberty 
is only possible within a social context that attempts to institutionally and 
republicanism—particularly Machiavelli’s ‘republic for expansion’, the importance of canonical 
‘law-givers’ or founding fathers, and the idea, made famous by Rousseau, of a ‘political religion’, 
are ideas associated with republicanism that have (rightly) been discarded in recent republican 
thought. Brugger, Republican theory in political thought, p. 182. 
76  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 239. 
77  Ibid., p. 18. 
78  Viroli, Machiavelli, p. 45. 
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collectively control power. The question central to the purposes of this 
article is how republicanism interrelates with IPT. The problem of under-
standing republican thought within the interstate realm revolves around 
republicanism’s focus upon the republican state. While republicanism is 
concerned with controlling power by the state, in world politics there is 
neither a global state nor the likelihood of such a state developing in the 
immediate future. While republicanism could be seen to advocate a single 
global republic—a civitas maxima,79 the argument here rests on the 
potential of republican states to be guided by their citizens to create 
elaborate forms of interstate cooperation and common governance. As will 
become clear, republican political thought claims that the institutional 
nature of republicanism does not stop at the borders of a state. As such the 
interpretation of the republican legacy drawn here as a normative approach 
to global politics, is dependent on both republican states and the institutional 
means that allows these states to exist and cooperate towards republican 
ends.  
REPUBLICAN GLOBAL ETHICS 
Because republicanism endeavours to control power via institutional 
means, republicanism as a form of IPT has a distinctive vision of global 
governance required to establish this theory’s ethical approach. In this 
sense the institutional essence of republicanism offers an interesting 
contrast to both prevailing forms of global governance and to the various 
approaches within IPT. In drawing republican ideals into the interstate 
realm it becomes clear that not only do republican ideals challenge 
prevailing forms of governance in a similar way to cosmopolitan 
approaches, but that republicanism is distinctive in that republicans 
promote the state as the foundation for ethical political action. I contend 
that there are three aspects to a republican approach to ethics in global 
politics.  
First, at its core, republicanism’s normative account of global politics is 
directed at realising a situation where individuals are able to live within a 
condition of non-domination by controlling to a maximal degree the power 
that is exerted over them. Those inspired by republican ethics see ‘the 
79  Martin Wight, International theory: The three traditions, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, eds 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 41. 
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domination of others as cause for real moral and political concern’;80 that 
being dominated is inherently wrong. This is a universal concern that 
animates the desire for the minimisation of vulnerability and subjection as 
well as the creation of a context where people are as autonomous as 
possible from arbitrary sources of power. This concern is also the 
justification for both domestic and international institutions that are 
designed to moderate or eliminate various forms of domination that could 
conceivably affect people. 
Second, while non-domination and the control of power is the universal 
condition desired, the means by which non-domination is actually 
constituted are not centralised or universal. Republicanism makes explicit 
reference to non-domination as being a social condition enabled by the 
publicly determined control of power through the state and by reference to 
particular ways of life and conditions. There are two primary consequences 
of this aspect of republicanism. The first is that republican thought in 
relation to global politics still stresses the presence of the state and civic 
involvement. For non-domination to be constituted, not only must there be 
the means of organised law making and public power, but people have to 
feel an ongoing responsibility for the public power they exercise, and they 
must be able to observe and discipline this power. A republican state fulfils 
these characteristics and thereby ought to minimise forms of imperium and 
dominium so that the state does not itself dominate its population nor permit 
private forms of domination. No other institution can replicate this exercise 
of public power. The second consequence of republicanism’s emphasis on 
the state and citizenship is that this account of politics is not cosmopolitan—
at least not in the strong political sense mentioned earlier. Ultimately, there 
is no single way to establish civic liberty nor is there a global public to build 
a republican state or foster a global common good at this stage. While 
republicans are dubious about the potential existence of a world state as 
well as the probability of establishing a universal civic liberty, republican 
theorists such as Pettit and Bellamy do contend that the republican state is 
ultimately only possible within a wider association of republican states. 
80  Gurpreet Rattan, ‘Prospects for a contemporary republicanism’, The Monist 84(1) 2001, pp. 113–30, 
at p. 127. Emphasis in original.  
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Therefore the third aspect of a republican approach to ethics is that the 
republican state’s control of power is only possible via political agreements 
that extend between republican states. Global governance of a republican 
inspiration will be aimed at enabling states to achieve the civic liberty 
particular to each society’s articulation of their public good. For Pettit the 
importance of enacting civic liberty entails that 
it is going to be in the interest of the republican state to encourage different 
layers of multinational cooperation and institutionalisation … while the 
republican state represents an indispensable means of furthering people’s non-
domination … there are some domestic issues on which it may be better from 
the point of view of promoting freedom as non-domination to give over 
control to those bodies and thereby to restrict the local state.81
As such Pettit believes republican sovereignty is not rigid or ‘sacred’, 
thereby recognising the possibility that the enactment of non-domination 
could be assisted by international institutions set up by the delegation of 
state authority.82 The desire to establish international cooperation that 
assists the development of non-domination requires a considerable 
elaboration of international institutions and a move away from exclusive 
and non-interventionist sovereignty.83 The external nature of republican 
approaches can also be seen in Daniel Deudney’s illustration of 
republicanism in the ‘Philadelphian system’ from 1781 until 1861 existing 
at the edge of the putative Westphalian system.84 In arguing that the states 
of the American Union ‘went beyond confederation, but stopped short of 
being an internally sovereign state’, he offers a historically grounded 
account of what the external dimensions of republicanism might resemble 
in practice. In particular he claimed that external ethos of the American 
Union could best be referred to as ‘negarchy’ as the Union sought to avoid 
the alternatives of hierarchy and anarchy among its composite states.85 
81  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 152. 
82  Ibid.  
83  Onuf, The republican legacy in international thought, pp. 5, 160–1. 
84  Daniel Deudney, ‘Popular sovereigns, bound states: The practices, structures and geopolitics of 
Philadelphian systems’, in Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds, State sovereignty as social 
construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
85  Ibid., p. 205.  
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This observation clearly intersects with the argument made here that 
republicanism’s primary modus operandi is non-domination. 
In order to enable states to be able to prioritise the pursuit of their public 
good, the infrastructure of republican global governance must enable states 
to cooperate to protect individuals from the domination of external sources 
and sanction states to pursue the common interests of their citizens globally. 
Therefore the global infrastructure of republican governance requires the 
promotion of peace and security through the promotion of the rule of 
international law and preventive diplomacy. In addition republicanism 
would rely on a republican democratic peace similar to the idea of the 
liberal democratic peace.86 Republican governance also requires effective 
global governance on matters that states cannot adequately manage alone—
to curtail the effects of domination that cut across time and space by 
promoting transborder issues such as environmental governance and the 
movement towards regulation of the global economy according to common 
rules.87 Governance aimed at non-domination ought to also promote the 
long-term benefits (seen in terms of non-domination) that stem from 
cooperation that assists states to create an infrastructure that prevents 
individual vulnerability and subjection. This means further extending 
international institutions that develop the capacities of states to address the 
broad ambit of human security concerns, which include measures that seek, 
86  Onuf, The republican legacy in international thought, chapter 9. See Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism 
and world politics’, American Political Science Review 80(4) 1986, pp. 1151–69. 
87  There is no room here to detail the republican relationship with capitalism or the regulation of 
capitalism. Yet Pettit sees republicanism as falling short of a socialist agenda by protecting private 
property, promoting economic prosperity and promoting the socioeconomic independence of people 
(Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 158–63). Onuf makes the point that ‘conspicuously missing from 
republican thought throughout its long and complex history is any conception of economic activity, 
of the economy as a sphere of activity that can (if given a chance) operate according to its own logic’ 
(Onuf, The republican legacy in international thought, p. 247). Republicanism’s aim is a society 
aimed at a common liberty where everyone in society feels secure—not a society where the wealth 
of a few individuals is prioritised. Consequently, republicans generally contend that this aim requires 
the regulation of capitalism. Thus there is a significant contrast between republicanism and neo-
liberalism as well as liberalism more generally. 
20  STEVEN SLAUGHTER 
 
 
for instance, to secure individual’s access to food, health resources and 
environmental protection.88
While the preceding measures could be seen to parallel those of many 
strands of liberal international theory, the ideal type of international arrange-
ment stemming from republicanism differs from cosmopolitan arguments in 
that the centrality of the state is more distinct, thereby moving towards a 
potentially global confederation; a confederative association of republican 
states. It could be claimed that republicanism moves towards the ‘civitas 
maximus’ that Christian Wolff outlined over 200 years ago, as colourfully 
detailed by Nicholas Onuf.89 However, the confederation is more like 
Onuf’s characterisation of Emmerich de Vattel’s confederation of states: an 
association of states that is consciously constructed by citizens and states—
not a ‘natural’ association like Wolff’s vision.90 In this sense the institutional 
nature of the republican approach to politics does not stop at the territorial 
borders of the republican state. 
This form of construction in global governance can be seen in the 
development of the European Union (EU), as emphasised by Bellamy and 
his colleagues. This articulation of republicanism is a position awkwardly 
termed ‘cosmopolitan communitarianism’ by Bellamy and Dario 
Castiglione.91 Rather than an EU informed by the abstract rights and 
federalism of cosmopolitanism or indeed the particular membership of 
political communities as suggested by communitarianism, Bellamy argues 
for an active encouragement of political negotiation between individuals 
and groups.92 Bellamy and Castiglione explain that the politically 
negotiated manner of this approach to the future of the EU 
88  For human security concerns see United Nations Development Programme, Human development 
report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
89  Onuf, The republican legacy in international thought, p. 58. 
90  Ibid., p. 60, chapters 3 and 4 more generally. 
91  Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, ‘Between cosmopolis and community: Three models of 
rights and democracy within the EU’, in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds, Re-
imagining political community: Studies in cosmopolitan democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 
p. 162. 
92  Bellamy, Liberalism and pluralism. 
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suggests the need for political rather than legal mechanisms, that are capable 
of mediating between different cultural and national groups. The normative 
foundations of this conception of the EU can perhaps be best characterized as 
a cosmopolitan communitarianism, in which different communities converge 
on a range of compatible perspectives on common goals and endeavours, 
rather than a communitarian cosmopolitanism which assumes a universal 
consensus on principles and procedures.93
In seeing the EU as a contingent and constantly adapting political process 
the EU takes on a light that differs significantly from a federation or a 
European ‘nation’. Nation-states would still exist within this ‘construc-
tionist’ view of a republican inspired EU.94 However, it seems that the 
ability of people to reshape the state in which they are citizens could be 
overtaken by the need to shape the EU and promote the goal of avoiding 
domination at the EU instead of at the state level. Even within Europe it is 
not clear that republicanism’s support of multi-level governance should or 
must come at the expense of being responsible and disciplining the power 
of the state in which citizens reside.95 At any rate the constructionist 
approach of republicanism offers a way of rethinking ethics and political 
responsibility within global politics in a way that incorporates republican 
values and practices into both state and interstate institutions. 
REPUBLICANISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY 
Republicanism, as it is understood here, is an approach to ethics within 
global politics that does not readily fit into the established accounts of 
IPT. Republicanism’s account of the way that non-domination is achieved 
cuts across idealist–realist lines and does not readily fit into the 
communitarian–cosmopolitan divide, although I do think that even though 
republicanism does not convey institutional cosmopolitanism, it does 
possess moral cosmopolitan elements. While republicanism does entail a 
suitably empowered state, which requires active participation and 
responsibility of its citizens, it does so within a universal concern for 
freedom from domination. 
93  Bellamy and Castiglione, ‘Between cosmopolis and community’, p. 173. 
94  Ibid., pp. 164–5, 173. 
95  See Steven Slaughter, ‘Republican liberty and the European Union’, Contemporary European 
Studies Association of Australia Review 28, June 2001, pp. 26–34. 
22  STEVEN SLAUGHTER 
 
 
With respect to the axis of realism and idealism, it is clear that 
republicanism does contend that cooperation and institutions related to 
moral concerns are possible within global politics. Nonetheless, these 
practices are coupled with a profound concern for power. This concern for 
power shapes both the way that republicans conceive of liberty and the way 
this liberty is established, as well as influencing republicanism’s approach to 
both domestic and global politics. Deeply embedded within contemporary 
republican thought and their antecedents is the idea that individual’s virtue 
may well fail and that ambition and self-interest are ever-present parts of 
life. Also, within republicanism there is the perspective that power is 
extremely important to the realisation of a just society. It is not purely well 
intentioned laws or morals that will guide society towards one characterised 
by non-domination but institutions that marshal public power and use 
checks and balances to both ward off the ambitious from controlling the 
state and to prompt citizens from taking responsibility to ensure that no one 
group in society has its interests masquerade as the public interest.96 
However, claiming that republicanism takes power seriously does not mean 
that republicanism is a realist approach to IPT. Realism overwhelmingly 
concentrates upon the international consequences of military power and 
thus security is typified by a tense balance of power between states (at best). 
Republicanism’s concern with power is wider and the emphasis is on 
personal security that is defined in a broader sense to include a security 
from non-military forms of domination as well as a concern for the 
domestic aspects of power which realism generally neglects. Furthermore, 
realism would clearly share little confidence in the republican idea that the 
building of international institutions can obtain security. 
With respect to debates between cosmopolitanism and comunitarianism, 
republicanism possesses an account of political community that advances 
the idea that being a citizen is not an abstract status or merely a bundle of 
rights but an ongoing stake in the political operation of the state in which 
citizens reside. As such, republicanism seeks to develop forms of politically 
engaged and patriotic political communities that are not inward looking or 
self-absorbed. As discussed earlier the social nature of the morality that 
constitutes non-domination avoids communitarian notions. Republicanism 
96  Skinner, Machiavelli, pp. 56–8. 
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does not embed any ethnic or nationalistic norms or conception of the good 
life other than a set of rigorous procedural norms that revolve around public 
responsibility and oversight.97 Furthermore, the republican tradition does 
express a concern for non-domination beyond the borders of one state. This 
extended concern does seem to move republicanism towards the cosmo-
politan pole of the cosmopolitan–communitarian axis. This is because 
republicanism’s assertion of non-domination is universal—even if the 
political means whereby this universalism is enacted is not. 
Nonetheless, republicanism does differ with cosmopolitanism in two 
main dimensions. First, while there is significant diversity within cosmo-
politan approaches to IPT, republicanism can be seen to promote liberty 
through institutions that people are responsible for rather than laws and 
rights that promote liberty. At the root of this divergence is the difference 
between liberty being defined as non-domination and as non-interference—
the former entails a liberty more dependent on the actions of people who 
construct and guide forms of public power to enable non-domination than a 
universal structure of law. In short: non-domination cannot be imposed. 
Second, and following from the first, is the importance of the state. 
Cosmopolitans such as Held and Falk discount the state from having the 
ideological and infrastructural coherence to be the site of a good society 
because the state is seen as being too territorial and too self-interested to 
address global problems. Thus it is no surprise that transnational social 
movements are forwarded as being able to act as the foundation for an 
alternative world order. This idea is most notably presented by Falk as the 
idea of ‘globalisation from below’.98 This alternative to the system of states 
and economic globalisation promotes principles of humane inclusion by 
way of an ‘imagined community for the whole of humanity’.99 Another 
formulation of a global polity that shares the belief that the state cannot 
manage globalisation is the idea of cosmopolitan democracy forwarded by 
Held. This proposal differs in that Held argues that no global vision is 
required, merely a belief in the principle of autonomy and in the process of 
97  Pettit, Republicanism, p. 8. See also Viroli, For love of country. 
98  Falk, On humane governance, pp. 205–6. 
99  Ibid., p. 243. 
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democracy.100 Republicanism concurs with the need to think globally but 
argues against giving up on the idea of an appropriately empowered state 
that is connected to actual citizens. For republicans, the objective is to 
reconstruct the state and the practice of citizenship with republican lessons 
in mind. 
The point of disagreement between cosmopolitanism and republicanism 
comes down to the issue of where power should rest. Republicanism is 
concerned by the potential of the global centralisation of power inherent in 
cosmopolitanism, its distance from ongoing public oversight and control, 
and the resultant reliance on the notion of rights rather than participation.101 
For republicans, states ought to remain as the foundation of public power 
with interstate institutions not replacing but instead augmenting the state. 
Yet clearly there are lessons that republicanism needs to learn from 
cosmopolitanism. The central challenge facing the development of repub-
lican politics is to enable states to develop and maintain political 
engagement and patriotism within the state without resorting to nationalist 
imagery. In an increasingly globalising world it is clear that republicanism 
necessarily involves a cosmopolitan-global awareness coupled with a sense 
of political responsibility for the state.102
While republicanism connotes the unavoidable necessity of the state, 
republicanism is not a form of realism or even internationalism. While the 
state can be defended on the grounds that it can play a ‘positive role’ in 
world politics, as Hedley Bull did in an internationalist vein, the republican 
justification for the state is qualitatively different.103 Bull’s defence of the 
state rested on four main claims: ‘that the state, whether we approve of it or 
not, is here to stay’; that global problems such as war, social injustice and 
environmental collapse are not solely due to the states-system; that states 
100  Held, Democracy and the global order, chapter 7. 
101  While there are questions relating to the dominance of Western values within these models (see 
Danilo Zolo, Cosmopolis: Prospects for world government (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997)), the 
republican state is central to the development of a secure liberty that balances universalism with 
particular cultural traditions and ways of life.  
102  See Steven Slaughter, Liberty beyond neo-liberalism: A republican critique of liberal governance in 
a globalising age (Houndsmills: Palgrave Press, forthcoming). 
103  Hedley Bull, ‘The state’s positive role in world affairs’, Daedalus 108, 1979, pp. 111–23.  
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can and do cooperate; and that there is no consensus for ‘transcending the 
states-system’.104 Republicanism would add to these attributes that the state 
is the location of governance aimed directly at the expression of the public 
good and the construction of liberty—the necessary role of the state. The 
distinction between republicanism and internationalism here is that repub-
licans contend that assisting states with the goal of non-domination of 
individuals should be the pole star of international institutions and that 
citizens, not just states, will have to play a role in ensuring that the 
international institutions needed to support that goal will be sufficiently 
developed.  
Republicanism offers an alternative approach within IPT that is distinc-
tive in three significant ways. First, republicanism’s core concern is the 
protection of individuals from subjugation or domination. Furthermore, 
individuals should be in the position to direct the deployment of means used 
to establish the means of protection both domestically and internationally. 
Second, republicanism’s hallmark is that the republican state should play a 
foremost role in this protection via the public disciplining of private forms 
of power through the state and through the state itself being designed to 
minimise potential domination. Third, republicanism’s emphasis is on 
political ethics. The institutional nature of republican thought demonstrates 
that global ethics and global governance are intimately inter-linked and that 
institutions are central to a preferred normative future. The idea that global 
governance ought to be understood as an ongoing construction of people 
trying to reduce domination differs from the idea that global governance is 
merely a technical exercise or a process determined by history or the mode 
of production or such. Republicanism can be seen to advance the idea that 
both the state and global governance ought to be more open to the conscious 
transformation by those wary of unaccountable and self-interested power.  
CONCLUSION: FUTURE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this paper is to advance the relatively modest suggestion 
that republicanism is omitted from conventional accounts of IPT and does 
not fit neatly into the established positions within IPT. However, the 
account of republicanism itself is a far from modest political program. 
104  Ibid., pp. 112–20. 
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Like many accounts of cosmopolitanism, the republican account articu-
lated here is an ambitious program that differs significantly from the 
prevailing nature of global politics. Not only are elaborate institutional 
arrangements needed at an interstate level but also significant changes are 
required from the ways people perceive authority and political respon-
sibility within their state. Even ‘gas and waterworks republicanism’ within 
democratic states requires a massive shift in the way people live the idea 
of political responsibility in their own state. Even while the idea of citizen 
responsibility may be seen to rest well with ethical diversity and pluralism 
to the extent that such pluralism necessitates political mechanisms rather 
than a moral consensus there are clearly both practical and theoretical 
challenges facing the idea of a world constituted by republican states. 
Thus there is a research agenda that is associated with taking repub-
licanism seriously as an approach to ethics within global politics that 
would have to include (among other issues) the study of:  
The political and cultural applicability of republicanism: How well would 
republican ideas travel? How could republican practices extend across 
contemporary global politics? How would this construction be affected by 
various cultural particularities? 
Development: Will republicanism be attractive to less developed states? 
What development programs and resources are needed to assist the 
formation of republican states? What processes of foreign development 
assistance are going to be able to offer constant and non-arbitrary sources 
of resources for less developed states?  
Distributive justice: How are resources to be distributed in order to avoid 
domination and vulnerability? What factors affect the distribution of 
crucial resources such as medicine, food and water? Is the republican 
balance between universal non-domination and particularism going to 
provide a sound global distribution of resources? 
Economic globalisation: How does the idea of a republican state interact 
with economic globalisation and neo-liberalism? What are the means by 
which republican states could ethically manage the world economy? 
Treatment of domination that is displaced across space and time: The 
environment is the primary example in mind here. Is environmental harm 
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that crosses state borders or generations a case of domination? If so, how 
do we prevent the transborder domination of environmental harm?  
Ultimately, given the institutional basis of republicanism, the details of 
these questions need to be examined in order for republicanism to be a 
robust perspective of IPT. Nonetheless, there is much to recommend 
republicanism as a novel approach to IPT and as a counterpoint to 
prevailing cosmopolitan arguments. Most importantly, the republican articu-
lation of IPT is inextricably tied to reinvigorating the state. Republicans 
assert that we need not globally extend democracy as cosmopolitans 
suggest, but instead reinvent the purpose of the state by reinvigorating the 
practice of citizenship. Citizens are required to maintain an appropriately 
empowered state in order to constitute the condition of non-domination. The 
goal of this political practice is not to create self-interested and chauvinistic 
states but rather to develop wider and wider circles of non-domination 
through both the presence of publicly responsive states and the operation of 
international institutions. Not only is this a novel claim within IPT, it is 
particularly apposite in a world that bears witness to various forms of 
domination and insecurity. Thus in a worldwide sense this entails an 
approach to IPT that takes power seriously and advocates a move towards a 
world shaped by the universalism of non-domination that is mediated and in 
a real sense constructed by citizens acting to avoid subjection. 
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